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Healthcare Law
by Kathryn Dunnam Harden*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article serves as a review of significant healthcare
developments in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit during this past survey period and builds upon Mercer Law
Review's past two Healthcare Articles 1 in Volumes 69 and 70.
Specifically, this Article will cover cases and trends involving
Healthcare Fraud.
II. NEW FALSITY STANDARD IN HOSPICE ELIGIBILITY CERTIFICATION
CASES
On September 9, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit issued its long-awaited
opinion, United States v. AseraCare, Inc. 2 As previously reported, the
decision was much anticipated as the case dealt with the legal standard
for the "falsity" element under the False Claims Act (FCA) 3 with regard
to hospice eligibility certifications, which has been "[o]ne of the
undecided areas of law in the Eleventh Circuit." 4
A. Underlying Litigation

*Associate Attorney, Hall Booth Smith, P.C. Mercer University (B.A., 2013); Mercer
Law School (J.D., 2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (2014–2016); Administrative
Editor (2015–2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. Kathryn S. Dunnam, Healthcare Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 69 MERCER L.
REV. 1209 (2018); Kathryn Dunnam Harden, Healthcare Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 70
MERCER L. REV. 1053 (2019).
2. 938 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019).
3. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)–(2) (2020).
4. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1375 (N.D. Ala. 2015).
5. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2016).
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At the district court level, the Government brought an action under
the FCA against AseraCare, Inc. (AseraCare), alleging that AseraCare
submitted false claims to Medicare on behalf of 123 hospice patients. 5
The Federal Regulation governing hospice Medicare eligibility requires
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certification of the patient's terminal illness. 6 "The certification must
specify that the individual's prognosis is for a life expectancy of 6
months or less if the terminal illness runs its normal course." 7 The FCA
provides, in relevant part, that if a person:
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval; [or] (B) knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent claim . . . is liable to the United
States Government [for civil penalties].8

05/29/2020 07:30:56

6. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 (2020).
7. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(1) (2020).
8. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2020). The FCA provides that "knowing" and "knowingly,"
(A) mean that a person, with respect to information—(i) has actual knowledge
of the information; (ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information; and (B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).
9. AseraCare, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1377.
10. Id. at 1385.
11. AseraCare, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1286.
12. Id. at 1283 (quoting United States ex rel. Parato v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr.
Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1339 (M.D. Ga. 2011)).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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In 2015, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama bifurcated the trial into two phases, with the "falsity element"
to be tried first.9 Upon AseraCare's motion, the court subsequently
granted a new trial because the court did not instruct the jury that "a
mere difference of opinion, without more, is not enough to show
falsity."10
In 2016, the district court granted, sua sponte, summary judgment in
favor of AseraCare.11 The court explained that the Government must
provide "proof of an objective falsehood" in prosecuting a FCA
violation.12 In making this "falsity" determination, the court disagreed
with the Government's argument that the lack of "clinical information"
in the patients' medical records supporting their hospice eligibility
warranted the claims for those patients as "false."13 "When hospice
certifying physicians and medical experts look at the very same medical
records and disagree about whether the medical records support hospice
eligibility, the opinion of one medical expert alone cannot prove falsity
without further evidence of an objective falsehood."14 Indeed, the
district court cautioned that if:
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[A]ll the Government needed to prove falsity in a hospice provider
case was one medical expert who reviewed the medical records and
disagreed with the certifying physician, hospice providers would be
subject to potential FCA liability any time the Government could find
a medical expert who disagreed with the certifying physician's
clinical judgment. The court refuses to go down that road.15

Therefore, the district court held that the Government failed to prove
falsity as a matter of law and granted, sua sponte, summary judgment
for AseraCare.16
B. Eleventh Circuit
On appeal, as the Eleventh Circuit aptly synopsized: "This appeal
requires us to consider how Medicare's requirements for hospice
eligibility—which are centered on the subjective 'clinical judgment' of a
physician as to a patient's life expectancy—intersect with the FCA's
falsity element."17 In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit first provided a
practical and thorough background of hospice care in the United States
and the availability of the federal government's Medicare benefits in
this regard.18 The Eleventh Circuit then structured its discussion and
legal analysis by "defining the contours of the hospice-eligibility
framework and clarifying the circumstances under which a claim
violates the requirements for reimbursement."19 Then, it "consider[ed]
the ways in which a hospice claim might be deemed 'false' for purposes
of the FCA."20
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15. Id. at 1285.
16. Id. at 1286. In its 2015 Memorandum Opinion, the court suggested that the
outcome may be different if the United States "offered [] evidence that AseraCare billed
for phantom patients, that it submitted Certificates of Terminal Illness [] with forged
signatures, or that any AseraCare employees lied to or withheld critical information from
the certifying doctors about any specific patients." AseraCare, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d at
1375.
17. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d at 1291.
18. Id. at 1282–84.
19. Id. at 1292.
20. Id.
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1.
The Hospice-Eligibility Determination Centers on
Clinical Judgment
With regard to the first prong of its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
explained that "[t]he language of the statute and implementing
regulations makes plain that the clinical judgment of the patient's
[physician or medical director] lies at the center of the eligibility
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inquiry."21 The pertinent regulation states in relevant part: "clinical
information and other documentation that support the medical
prognosis . . . accompany the certification" and are "filed in the medical
record."22 In addition, "[t]his 'medical prognosis' is, itself, 'based on the
physician's . . . clinical judgment.'"23 "Importantly, none of the relevant
language states that the documentary record underpinning a
physician's clinical judgment must prove the prognosis as a matter of
medical fact."24 "Rather, the framework asks a physician responsible for
the patient's care to exercise his or her judgment as to the proper
interpretation of the patient's medical records." 25
While there is no question that clinical judgments must be tethered
to a patient's valid medical records, it is equally clear that the law is
designed to give physicians meaningful latitude to make informed
judgments without fear that those judgments will be second-guessed
after the fact by laymen in a liability proceeding.26

Thus, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Government's argument on
appeal that "supporting documentation must, standing alone, prove the
validity of the physician's initial clinical judgment."27

05/29/2020 07:30:56

21. Id. at 1293.
22. Id. at 1294 (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(2)).
23. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(2)).
24. Id. at 1293.
25. Id. at 1294.
26. Id. at 1295.
27. Id. at 1294.
28. Id. at 1297. While acknowledging that this issue is a matter of first impression,
the Eleventh Circuit relied upon holdings from the United States Courts of Appeals for
the First, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits with regard to the "objective
falsity" requirement. Id. at 1298.
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2.
Objective Falsity: More Than a Reasonable Difference in
Clinical Judgment
With regard to the second prong of its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the district court's decision that "in order to show objective
falsity as to a claim for hospice benefits, the Government must show
something more than the mere difference of reasonable opinion
concerning the prognosis of a patient's likely longevity." 28 As long as
"the underlying clinical judgment does not reflect an objective
falsehood," then the claim will not be false "when a hospice provider
submits a claim that certifies that a patient is terminally ill 'based on
the physician's or medical director's clinical judgment regarding the
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normal course of the individual's illness.'" 29 Indeed, "[a]ll the legal
framework asks is that physicians exercise their best judgment in light
of the facts at hand and that they document their rationale." 30
The Eleventh Circuit unequivocally held, in hospice reimbursement
cases, that
in order to properly state a claim under the FCA . . . a plaintiff
alleging that a patient was falsely certified for hospice care must
identify facts and circumstances surrounding the patient's
certification that are inconsistent with the proper exercise of a
physician's clinical judgment. Where no such facts or circumstances
are shown, the FCA claim fails as a matter of law.31

Thus, where there is no other factual allegation of falsity, the
Eleventh Circuit's decision eliminates the opportunity for a jury to
decide "in [a] battle of experts . . . which expert it [thinks] to be more
persuasive, with the less persuasive opinion being deemed to be false." 32
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's grant of a
new trial, vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of
AseraCare after the verdict had been reached, and remanded 33 for the
district court to reconsider the matter based on the entirety of the
evidence.34
3.
Practical Guidance
While the Eleventh Circuit was critical of the Government framing
its FCA case around the notion that a physician's clinical judgment as
to a patient prognosis can be "false," 35 it did provide guidance by way of
hypothetical situations where objective falsity may occur:
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 77 Side A
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29. Id. at 1296–97.
30. Id. at 1296.
31. Id. at 1297.
32. Id. at 1288–89.
33. The Eleventh Circuit cautioned that, on remand, the Government must be able to
link the allegations regarding AseraCare's business practices to the specific Medicare
claims brought forth in the case. Id. at 1305. This link is necessary to establish
"falsehood" and "knowledge." Id. Specifically, the Government must link the allegedly
flawed certification practices to the claims identified from the sample size of the total
patients AseraCare billed Medicare for hospice care. Id. at 1285, 1305.
34. Id. at 1305. While the Eleventh Circuit commended the district court for vacating
the original verdict in order to apply the appropriate falsity standard, the Eleventh
Circuit disagreed with the district court's limitation of evidence for consideration in its
sua sponte grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1301–05.
35. Id. at 1296.
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1. "Where, for instance a certifying physician fails to review a
patient's medical records or otherwise familiarize himself with the
patient's condition before asserting that the patient is terminal, his
ill-formed 'clinical judgment' reflects an objective falsehood."
2. "The same is true where a plaintiff proves that a physician did not,
in fact, subjectively believe that his patient was terminally ill at the
time of certification."36
3. "A claim may also reflect an objective falsehood when expert
evidence proves that no reasonable physician could have concluded
that a patient was terminally ill given the relevant medical
records."37

Notably, with the foregoing examples, "the clinical judgment on
which the claim is based contains a flaw that can be demonstrated
through verifiable facts."38
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately agreed with the Northern
District of Alabama's falsity standard. 39 It is insufficient for the
Government to use a "mere difference of reasonable opinion" by way of
expert testimony to establish "proof of an objective falsehood" in hospice
eligibility certification cases.40 With the AseraCare decision, the
Eleventh Circuit has provided clarity "in the often clinically murky area
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36. In contrast, in AseraCare, Inc.:
the Government never alleged that AseraCare's doctors relied on medical
documentation that was too thin, vague, or lacking in detail to reasonably
substantiate their 'clinical judgments' of terminal illness. Indeed, there is no
dispute that each patient certification was supported by a meaningful set of
medical records evidencing various serious and chronic ailments for which the
patient was entitled to some level of treatment.
Id. at 1288.
37. Id. at 1297. The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly emphasized that, not only did the
Government's own expert fail to conclude that the AseraCare physicians lied, the expert
also failed to conclude that the AseraCare physicians' clinical judgments were
unreasonable or wrong. Id. at 1300. The expert "never testified that, in his opinion, no
reasonable doctor could have concluded that the identified patients were terminally ill at
the time of certification. Instead, he only testified that, in his opinion, the patients were
not terminally ill." Id. at 1287. While not legally operative, the Eleventh Circuit also
found it worth noting that the expert changed his opinion regarding the hospice eligibility
of certain patients during the proceedings. Id. at 1287–88. In addition, another
Government witness testified that "two doctors using their clinical judgment could come
to different conclusions about a patient's prognosis and neither be right or wrong." Id. at
1305 n.18.
38. Id.
39. See AseraCare, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1377.
40. Id.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 78 Side A

05/29/2020 07:30:56

[8] HEALTHCARE LAW CP (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

HEALTHCARE LAW

5/20/2020 1:28 PM

1057

of complex medical practice."41 Moving forward, "absent a showing of an
objective and knowing falsehood, the FCA is an inappropriate
instrument to serve as the Government's primary line of defense
against questionable claims for reimbursement of hospice benefits." 42
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CLARITY IN FCA QUI TAM ACTIONS
As reported last year, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided to resolve a circuit split involving the proper interpretation of
the FCA's statute of limitations provisions.43 On November 16, 2018,
the Supreme Court granted Cochise Consultancy Inc.'s Petition for Writ
of Certiorari in Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt.44
In the underlying case, U.S. ex rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc., et
al.,45 the Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, that the
FCA's tolling provision applies to a relator's claim even when the
government has not intervened.46 In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court's determination otherwise, reasoning that
the critical consideration is the government's knowledge of the material
facts, not the relator's. This decision aligned with the Ninth Circuit, but
only to the extent that relators may take advantage of the tolling
provision.47 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit and Tenth Circuit previously
determined that the tolling provision is only available in qui tam
actions when the government actually intervened and is a party to the
suit.48
On May 13, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its opinion ultimately
affirming the Eleventh Circuit's more generous interpretation of 31
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41. Zack Buck, Keeping an Eye on the Eleventh, HARV. L. BLOG: BILL OF HEALTH
(June 29, 2017), http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2017/06/29/keeping-an-eye-on-theeleventh#more-22892.
42. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d at 1301.
43. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt, 139 S. Ct. 1507 (2019); 31
U.S.C. § 3731(b).
44. 139 S. Ct. 566 (2018).
45. 887 F.3d 1081 (11th Cir. 2018).
46. Id. at 1083.
47. Id. at 1096; see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 91 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.
1996).
48. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 288, 294 (4th
Cir. 2008) (explaining that "[t]he government's knowledge of 'facts material to the right of
action' does not notify the relator of anything, so that knowledge cannot reasonably begin
the limitations period for a relator's claims"); U.S. ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence BlueCross
BlueShield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 724–25 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that legislative history
supports the interpretation that the tolling provision does not apply to private qui tam
suits).
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U.S.C. § 3731(b).49 The tolling provision will be available to a relator
regardless of whether or not the government intervenes in the action. 50
In addition, the statute of limitations does not commence until the
United States official knew or should have known the relevant facts and
not when the qui tam relator knew or should have known such
knowledge.51
IV. CONCLUSION
This past survey has seen significant developments in the field of
healthcare law. In AseraCare, the Eleventh Circuit provided clarity in
FCA hospice eligibility certification cases and raised the requisite
standard for the Government to establish "falsity."52 In Cochise, the
Supreme Court expanded the statute of limitations for FCA qui tam
actions where the Government does not intervene, providing more
leeway for qui tam relators.53
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Cochise Consultancy, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1514.
Id. at 1511–12.
Id. at 1514.
AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278.
Cochise Consultancy, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1507.
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